When we think about thinking, there are two questions we might try to answer: How should Inevitably there was a reaction. The response of many was, in effect, "Whom are you calling irrational?" Some critics suggested that it was Kahneman and Tversky, not their subjects, who were reasoning irrationally (see Gigerenzer, 1996) . In Thinking, Fast and Slow Kahneman refers only briefly to the argument, but the several rejoinders and counterrejoinders marked a heated dispute. The rationality debate had escalated into the rationality wars.
the answer to one suggests an answer to the other. The degree to which the answers converge identifies a position in what has been called the great rationality debate-is human thinking rational? The debate has been the focus for much of the research on thinking during the last 50 years.
Daniel Kahneman has been a leading figure in the debate for most of that time. Now, in
Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman provides a comprehensive review of what we have learned and a unique personal account of his own role. This impressive book offers a thoughtful yet nontechnical resolution of the rationality debate and should be read by anyone who is seeking a sensible assessment of human reasoning. It is destined to become a landmark in the history of research on thinking.
Fifty years ago, normative theories were regarded as pretty good descriptions of how we think. Theories assumed that we think the way we should, with a few adjustments here and there. A few investigators objected to this view. My students and I (Pitz, Downing, & Reinhold, 1967) demonstrated that people sometimes violate the prescriptions of normative theory in fundamental ways. But it took a series of elegant articles by Kahneman and his colleague Amos Tversky to shatter the consensus. Their studies of heuristics and biases demonstrated that people are prone to serious violations of normative theory. Their work influenced all subsequent research on judgment and choice.
Inevitably there was a reaction. The response of many was, in effect, "Whom are you calling irrational?" Some critics suggested that it was Kahneman and Tversky, not their subjects, who were reasoning irrationally (see Gigerenzer, 1996) . In Thinking, Fast and Slow Kahneman refers only briefly to the argument, but the several rejoinders and counterrejoinders marked a heated dispute. The rationality debate had escalated into the rationality wars.
Two Ways of Thinking
Resolution of the debate, and an uneasy truce in the wars, gradually emerged. A number of authors suggested that there might be two different ways in which people think: one being rapid, largely automatic, and prone to error; the other slow, deliberate, and more accurate. Stanovich (1999) developed these ideas into a comprehensive account of the heuristics and biases literature, referring to the two processes as System 1 and System 2. Kahneman has adopted Stanovich's terminology and most of his theoretical apparatus as the framework for Thinking, Fast and Slow.
Kahneman describes the two systems as separate characters in a story about the mind. This is a useful although potentially hazardous heuristic device. He insists that we should not think of the systems as separate little homunculi in the mind; they are shorthand labels for a more exact description of mental activity. It is important to keep this in mind, since, as Kahneman demonstrates, it is too easy to slip into storytelling as an alternative to reasoning.
Which is greater: half a dozen dozen or six dozen dozen? If your first thought was "Surely they're the same," then System 1 was working as designed: fast, automatic, although, in this case, wrong. If you thought, "Wait-cancel out the dozen dozen on each side; six is greater than a half," then System 2 was also alert.
Notice that System 2 recruits System 1 to serve its purpose. The knowledge "Six is greater than a half" comes from System 1. Notice also that System 2 is involved even if you make an error, in which case it accepts the System 1 response but without further review. Only by reading the question carefully do you notice the error.
This trivial example illustrates the key ideas that Kahneman uses to explain the results of many years of research on thinking and reasoning. Much of his book contains an account of how we reach invalid conclusions and a description of how he and Tversky worked toward the current understanding.
The catch phrase that Kahneman uses is WYSIATI: What you see is all there is. Our inability to consider possibilities beyond those that are immediately obvious accounts for much of the apparently irrational behavior that has been observed. Six is the same as half a dozen; that settles it.
As Kahneman points out, though, it is a mistake to conclude that humans are fundamentally irrational. Through millions of years of evolution by natural selection, the human mind has acquired an ability to respond efficiently to important stimuli such as the facial expressions of other people. Through practice we can also acquire skills such as arithmetic that have only a rudimentary genetic basis, and these skills may become effortless. Unfortunately, we often apply these abilities to situations for which they are not suitable. Worse, we do not recognize that we have responded that way.
Kahneman notes the evolutionary origins of System 1 but does not say much about where System 2 comes from. The built-in reactions of System 1 permit us to respond effectively to many situations. However, the complexity of our environment, especially our social environment, makes it impossible to rely solely on automatic solutions. Presumably a
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general problem-solving capacity evolved that we can use whenever System 1 fails us.
Hence System 2. Stanovich (2004) suggested another way of looking at the two systems. The ultimate goal of evolution is survival of the genes through reproduction. Although the well-being of an individual is often consistent with this goal, there are times when the goals of the genes and the individual conflict. Sex, the act of reproduction itself, provides many examples. In a species for which all behavior is preprogrammed, the conflict will always be resolved in favor of the genes. However, humans are able to reflect on their own goals and rebel against the dictates of the genes.
Using System 2 to override System 1 demands cognitive resources. The ability to reason depends on the capacity of working memory and is correlated with measures of general intelligence. But intelligence is not sufficient to guarantee accurate reasoning. Kahneman notes that System 2 is inherently lazy and overrides System 1 only if one is willing to exert the necessary effort. People differ in their inclination to think that way, so the propensity to make errors of reasoning depends on factors other than intelligence.
Critics of the early work by Kahneman and Tversky raised several objections, but one complaint was especially significant. Using labels for heuristics such as availability (making judgments based only on the evidence at hand) or anchoring (being influenced by anchor points, even when they are irrelevant) does not explain how or why they happen. Of course, identifying and labeling heuristics is a necessary first step toward understanding them. At a minimum, Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that an adequate descriptive theory was unlikely to emerge from simple adjustments to the normative theories. Still, psychologists needed a testable theory that describes the underlying processes.
Dual process theory provides a start for such a theory, but many details need to be worked out. System 1 and System 2 are also nothing more than labels unless we have a theory of how they work. One valuable contribution of Thinking, Fast and Slow is a more complete description of the mechanisms that are involved. For example, Chapter 11 explains how investigators came to understand the way in which anchoring works. Chapter 12 offers valuable insights into processes that lead to the availability bias.
Equally instructive is Kahneman's account of his cooperation with Gary Klein in the study of intuitive judgment. Klein has been a critic of the heuristics and biases research, perhaps because he has studied areas in which intuitive judgments are very accurate. We now know that intuitive judgments by experts can be accurate, provided that the experts are working in a stable, predictable environment and that they have an extended opportunity to learn how things work in that environment. Unfortunately, there are too many situations in which these criteria are not met and yet intuitive judgments are expressed with great confidence.
Kahneman's description of the processes is still a little fuzzy in places. For example, on several occasions he suggests that when we are presented with a difficult problem, System 2 may substitute the answer to an easy problem that System 1 can solve. For example, "People are asked for a prediction but they substitute an evaluation of the evidence" (p.
188).

Are the Rationality Wars Over?
The terminology leaves me rather uneasy. Surely Kahneman does not mean that we do this deliberately: "I'm asked to predict the future, but I'll just evaluate the evidence instead." Does he mean only that it is "as if" a person behaves this way? A better explanation of how the two systems interact might be derived from the theory of spreading activation, which Kahneman describes elsewhere. The theory is often used to explain how one idea prompts another, associated idea, and one should be possible to generate testable predictions from it.
Dual process theory does not yet provide a complete answer to the question of when and why human thinking is error prone. Critics of the theory have already voiced some concerns.
For example, Keren and Schul (2009) argued that there may be no need to postulate two separate systems and raised several other points that need to be addressed by dual process theorists. Nevertheless, I expect that Thinking, Fast and Slow will turn out to be an invaluable statement of what we know now and will be used as the foundation for further development of the theory.
As powerful as Kahneman's presentation may be, I doubt that critics of his research will remain silent. There are still some economists who believe that the emphasis on heuristic thinking is misguided. Gintis (2009, p. 246) has accused psychologists who emphasize inconsistencies in human behavior of being "immature, short-sighted, and scientifically destructive," words that suggest a return to the rationality wars that we thought were over.
Kahneman's final chapters discuss his recent research on pain and pleasure, the most basic of human preferences. The data lead him to conclude, "An inconsistency is built into the design of our minds" (p. 385). He challenges directly the assumptions made by Gintis and some other economists. His evidence is powerful, and now it is the responsibility of the critics to demonstrate that he is wrong.
In his review of the rationality debate, Stanovich (1999) identified three positions that participants in the debate might adopt. Stanovich used the term meliorist to describe those who assert that people deviate from normative prescriptions and who believe that we can do better. Panglossians assert that there is nothing incoherent in human reasoning and that we are necessarily rational. Apologists acknowledge that although our thinking is not ideal, we perform as evolution intended us to perform, and no improvement is possible.
Thinking, Fast and Slow leaves little support for the Panglossian position, but Kahneman does not offer much encouragement either to those who would seek to make things better.
There is little evidence that learning about errors of reasoning reduces the number of errors that people make. Kahneman admits that half a century of studying thinking may have left him as prone to making mistakes as ever. All he can say is, "I have made much more progress in recognizing the errors of others than my own" (p. 417).
That may well be the most important contribution of Thinking, Fast and Slow. We now have a language in which we can discuss the reasoning of others. Provided we are humble enough to recognize that others can describe our own thinking as well as theirs in the same terms, disagreements and debates can only become more fruitful.
